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Introduction and Motivation
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) show that the ownership structure of vertically organized companies, known as corporate pyramids, are widespread around the world. However, these structures are more often present in emerging markets (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) . Morck (2009) highlights that it is the power of pyramids, which is disguised to outside observers. Most of the literature on the topic considers a wealthy family at the top of the pyramid, while much less attention has been paid to the state as the ultimate owner (see Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005) . We present evidence of the state being in control within a corporate pyramid in an emerging economy with a web of seemingly private companies. Our detailed analysis of the data shows that the direct control of the state was significant and was further enhanced via golden share holdings.
However, we find that integrated state control had a detrimental effect on corporate performance, which declined over time and became negative. We conclude that integrated state control was not effectively used by the state, a finding that indicates the inefficiency of a state bureaucracy. Although the amount of state control is significant in the data, we do not find evidence of integrated state control employed to an extent similar to corporate structures in Russia or China.
The integrated control of the state may evolve from having direct control through a majority voting right, and increase with the increased influence of having a golden share, to the institution of a complex control structure like an ownership pyramid. In general, a corporate pyramid is a group of firms whose ownership structure follows a topto-bottom direction of control, where the ultimate owner is at the top and exerts its control over firms at successive lower levels. This fractal-like pattern of ownership can proliferate to several levels.
Thus the key characteristics of a corporate pyramid are ownership and control, which lends the ultimate owner leveraged power over minority shareholders. Already in 1932 Berle and Means had pointed to the existence of a great discrepancy present in corporate pyramids between the ultimate owner's control and cash-flow rights. These control rights are typically high due to the controlling devices described in the previous paragraphs, while cash-flow rights may be considerably lower as articulated in Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000) . Traditionally it is assumed that pyramids are formed to allow the ultimate owner to achieve control over a firm by using only a small cash flow stake. This arrangement inevitably leads to less-than-efficient corporate governance and associated agency problems. Further reasons for the existence of pyramidal groups include the limited liability of separately registered groups, more space for the promotion of managers to top positions as well as better monitoring of managers, and the provision of capital under favorable conditions to other firms within the structure (Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005) . However, despite the ubiquity of pyramidal business groups, no formal theory explains their existence (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006).
It is frequently assumed that the disparity stemming from the ownership and control characteristics of the pyramid combined with inadequate institutions and market regulations produce in many emerging markets conditions favorable to the expropriation of minority shareholders, also known as "tunneling". , 2007) . The switch from a command to a market economic system has provided a unique opportunity to study the behavior of the state in the role of the ultimate owner at the top of a pyramid.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly describe the privatization program and data in Sections 2 and 3. Then we proceed with an analysis of the true extent of integrated state control in Section 4. We present evidence of the effects of state control on corporate performance in Section 5. In the concluding section we summarize our findings and chart potential further research.
Privatization Program
After the "velvet revolution" in 1989, the Czech Republic emerged from their centrallyplanned economy to re-instate a market economy and democracy. A massive privatization program was administered in the Czech Republic in the first half of the 1990s under three different schemes: restitution, small-scale privatization, and large-scale privatization. We only reiterate the main aspects of the Czech privatization that are relevant for this study since the process has been extensively described in the literature, e.g., Hanousek and Kroch (1998) and Kočenda (1999) . The first two schemes began in 1990 and were most important during the early years of the transition. Large-scale privatization, by far the most important scheme, began in 1991, was completed in early 1995, and allowed for various privatization techniques. Small firms were usually auctioned off or sold in tenders. Many medium-sized businesses were sold in tenders or to predetermined buyers in direct sales. Most large and many medium-sized firms were transformed into joint stock companies and their shares were distributed through voucher privatization (almost one-half of the total number of all the shares of all joint stock companies were privatized in the voucher scheme), sold in public auctions or to strategic partners, or transferred to municipalities. At the beginning it was the Ministry of Privatization that executed the privatization process. The privatization authorities had rough goals regarding how much property they wanted to include in the voucher program, and hence how much control should stay with the state. To administer the property that remained in the state's possession, the National Property Fund (NPF) was established as a state institution that 3 The method of the privatization of each state-owned firm was decided on the basis of an officially accepted privatization project. According to the law, all state-owned enterprises were selected for either the first or the second privatization wave, or they were temporarily exempted. Each selected firm had to submit an official privatization proposal that was usually crafted by the firm's management under the tutelage (and responsibility) of its sectoral ministry. Any domestic or foreign corporate body or individual was allowed to present a competing project that was to be considered on an equal footing with the official one. 4 The regulation of PIFs evolved gradually through Decree no. 383/1991, its Amendment No. 62/1992, and Act No. 248/1992. The most important clauses restricted each privatization fund from investing more than 10% of the points acquired in the voucher scheme in a single company and obtaining in exchange more than 20% of the shares in any company. Privatization funds established by a single founder were allowed to accumulate up to 40% of shares in a given company, but this cap was later reduced to 20%. Many privatization funds circumvented the cap through mergers. The Act also prohibited PIFs founded by financial institutions from purchasing the shares of other financial institutions to prevent excessive concentration of financial capital (for details see Kotrba and Svejnar, 1994 ).
was entitled with legal power to exercise property rights over companies that were fully or partially owned by the state. By the end of the scheme in 1994 the NPF held on average about a 25% stake in privatized firms, but the extent varied greatly. The NPF was dissolved at the end of 2005 and the remaining agenda was transferred to the Ministry of Finance. 5 In our analysis we uncover the true extent of state control over the seemingly private economy resulting from this privatization procedure.
Data and Control in the Pyramid
We have assembled a large data set on the extent of ownership in a large sample of Czech firms over the period 1996-2005. The beginning of our data sample starts one year after the privatization scheme officially ended (February 1995) . The end of our sample coincides with the end of the NPF as an institution. The data come from the archives of the NPF, the former Ministry of Privatization, the Prague Stock Exchange, the Center for Securities in Prague, the commercial database Aspekt, and the Commercial Register of the Czech Republic. For all the firms in our sample we also precisely identify their ownership structure. Therefore we are working with a uniquely large sample of firms that is near the total population of medium-sized and large firms in the economy. More detailed information on the sample size in each period is provided in Section 4 along with our results on the extent of state control.
From our data we are able to isolate the specific extent of ownership represented by the state corporate pyramid as well as distinguish various means of state direct and indirect control and the amount of assets under control. In this respect we are able to trace the development of state control in a number of firms and also control over their assets over time.
The interrelated ownership structure within the state pyramid is illustrated in Figure 1 . On the top layer we identify three main institutions through which the state is able to execute control. The key institution is the National Property Fund (NPF) that was set up to administer the property that remained in the hands of the state after the Then the n-square matrix D = (d ij ) represents the direct cross-ownership rights in the data set of n firms. In many cases we do not have information about ownership links below a certain control-right threshold. This is often an indication of dispersed ownership in a firm. We acknowledge this limitation by stating that:
An integrated ownership via a structure such as a corporate pyramid can be constructed as a sum of all direct and indirect ownership links. Integrated ownership is crucial for the consolidation of the ownership structure and it has strong implications for corporate governance issues, namely effective control and firm behavior. It can be constructed via a matrix approach or by using recursive algorithms.
Using the matrix approach, the matrix of integrated ownership P = (p ij ) is defined as:
In the above equation the diagonal matrix factor is a necessary scaling factor of ∑ that could otherwise suffer from a double counting of voting rights.
In real firm level data we observe various ownership cycles as well as a combination of direct and indirect links of length s that may stretch across several levels or layers as described earlier. For this reason we need a scaling factor rather than a simple summation of voting rights to avoid an implausible extent of control greater than one hundred percent.
We suggest measuring the direct control over companies by using a conservative majority threshold of 50% in accordance with Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000) and specify the following ownership-control matrix:
In the above definition we also control for the existence of a majority owner k and this way we eliminate the double counting of controlling stakes. Simply said, in the case of a 50% majority owner, other stakes have no real controlling power. The rule can be generalized to different controlling thresholds employed in the literature (as in La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999) and as such it describes the ownership links in a clear and simple manner. Following the matrix approach we finally define the control extent P of the integrated, or ultimate, owner in a corporate pyramid as:
The above approach is versatile enough to enable analysis of the true extent of control of any type of owner, including that of the state in incompletely privatized companies.
The empirical application of the matrix methodology is extremely demanding since with representative samples of firm level data exceeding several thousand firms and subjects the matrices are very large and their mathematical inversions require large amounts of computer memory and time. In the empirical part of our analysis we therefore implement inverse matrices and compute the integrated ownership via the recursive SQL algorithm described in detail in Bena, Hanousek and Fons-Rosen (2009).
In practice we consider the state to be an owner, at the zero level, in all companies where the state holds equity via the NPF. Being at zero level means that there is no other owner that owns the state. Companies may also have other zero-level owners in cases where the state does not hold a 100% stake. In this case owners may be truly private entities or another state agency or municipality as shown in Figure 1 . Further, we define one-level owners as those who are owned by zero-level owners; in the majority of cases the zero-level owner is the state via the NPF. Two-level owners are those that are owned by one-level owners. We also check for cases where a two-level owner may have a zerolevel owner besides a one-level owner(s). We continue this distinction among the ownership levels down to the final potential level (ranging between eight to 12 levels) in a manner similar to Khanna and Yafeh (2007), who consider nine levels. The effect of pyramidal control across various levels is chiefly possible through banks and privatization investment funds (investment companies). A state owning a decisive control stake in a bank is able to exert its control on firms in which the bank holds a substantial stake. Banks own also investment companies that in turn hold shares of other firms.
These channels constitute the basis for the pyramidal control of the state.
We follow the approach of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and measure the control by total voting rights since control over a company is primarily a matter of voting power. In order to gauge the true control of the state we distinguish two categories of ownership concentration, depending on the number of shares held by the state in privatized companies. In the divisions of stakes that allow for effective control we follow Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2007) and use first a 50% threshold as the law provides important rights of ownership and control for owners with majority ownership (more than 50% of shares) and it also conforms to the practice in the literature based on
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Simply speaking, a 50% threshold cannot be contested and in empirical work it also prevents potential miscalculations of two majority owners. The second and less conservative threshold is 25%, which is in line with the relatively high ownership concentration present in Czech firms as well as with the methodological approach by the Bureau Van Dijk (2007, p.18). Still, when using the 25% threshold we are slightly more conservative than La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) , who opt for 20%. When using the 25% threshold we verify that there is no other owner with an exceeding stake who could override the control of the state.
Besides direct control through voting rights associated with the number of shares held, state control over a firm may also be executed by other means. The most effective one is the "golden" share. 6 Such an instrument, in the form of a single share with special status, allows the state to prevent any major changes in a company where the state holds such a share. 7 Utility companies are a typical example of state control through the golden share, but not the only example, as the golden share has been part of the ownership structure in other industries as well.
Extent of State Control
An earlier assessment of the extent of state control over privatized firms was performed 
State Control over Firms
We now turn to providing the results of the analysis that accounted for the pyramidal control of an integrated owner and reporting the extents of control obtained via the matrix methodology described in Section 3. The control potential of the state pyramid is presented in several Tables. 8 We begin with a simple account and in the first two columns of Table 1 is that the pyramid structure in which the NPF represents the state as the ultimate owner does not seem to add much to its direct ability to control. On the other hand, the instrument of the golden share is an important mechanism that enhances the control of the state considerably.
In Table 2 we present data in the same structure as in 
State Control over Total Assets and Sales of Firms
The numbers in Tables 1 and 2 do not reflect one important fact, which is the size of firms. By size we mean the importance of a company in terms of its ability to generate taxes and dividends, to provide employment and therefore tax income, and to provide economic opportunities for suppliers, which also provide employment and generate taxes.
Hence, control over large companies creates a potential for achieving various economic and non-economic objectives. Indeed, the state has controlling voting rights in companies that differ by the size and extent of activities. In order to evaluate the extent of state control, taking the size and importance of the companies into account, we calculate the various degrees of state control using total assets and sales volumes. The total assets of a firm can be considered as a proxy for the size of each firm controlled by the state. Hence, it allows inferring the extent of state control over the large and important firms in the economy. Sales on other hand can be seen as an indication of the potential amount of taxes the state collects from controlled firms. These two proxies enable us to derive a perception of the economic power of the companies and consequently the extent of wealth that is controlled by the state through direct as well as pyramidal ownership channels. In terms of the volume of assets of firms where the state had voting rights a decreasing trend can bee seen in Tables 3 and 4 . This pattern is paralleled in the evolution of assets over which the state as the NPF had majority voting rights (Table 3) . Needless to say, the broadly-defined state manages to directly control a larger extent of those assets (Table 4) . We see that the volumes of assets the state was able to control directly were decreasing over time from initially very high levels. The gradual decrease was at a slower rate in the case of the state defined broadly (Table 4 ) when compared to the position of the NPF (Table 3 ). An increase in controlled assets is evidenced only in 1996 for both voting thresholds; otherwise the extent of control remains on par with direct control.
Increases in the property controlled through the pyramid and golden share are found to be more important, especially over the years 1997-2002. This finding hints at the preferences of the state to control the largest and most important firms directly rather than to engage in complicated schemes.
When we use the 25% threshold the general results are similar to those for the 50% one (Panel B in Tables 3 and 4 Tables 1 and 2 ). The direct control of the state over the volume of sales decreases as well. This decrease is much slower when compared to total assets (Tables 5 and 6 ) and especially in the case of the broadly defined state it is marginal (Table 6) . One explanation may be the stable increases in the productivity of Czech firms because since 1998 inflation has been low and stable with a declining trend, being managed under an inflation targeting regime (Orlowski, 2008) The extensive results on direct as well as integrated control of the state over the firms in the Czech Republic provides evidence that the state was primarily engaged in direct control. Arguably, the intention of the state to create special structures to effectively control firms and, hence, the economy was limited as opposed to empirical evidence from other transformation economies. Or an even more realistic explanation could be that the state was less than optimally organized and therefore did not exploit all means of control that, for example, a corporate pyramid offers. Surely, the integrated control of the state via a pyramid as well as its enhancement by the golden share was found to be less extensive than for example in Russia or China. These two large countries have run truly centralized economies, while centralization in the Czech Republic was less strict. These conditions might also be causes behind our findings as the Czech state bureaucracy apparently developed less efficient control enforcement than these two strictly centralized countries. Nevertheless, the control potential of the state remained substantial for a long period of time since we document that the state has been giving up its positions in firms only gradually and through a lengthy process.
Effect of State Control on Corporate Performance
In this section we complement our findings on the extent of state control by analyzing Our goal is to provide evidence of whether there is an effect of a specific level of state control on firms' performance and if so what is its magnitude.
In this respect we aim to perform an econometric analysis in the spirit of Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) and Angrist and Pischke (2009), whose approach we follow.
Our model to be estimated is specified as a firm's performance being a function of ownership structures and some controls. Our specification, which exploits the intensively panel structure of our data and allows for fixed effects, bears the following form:
In the above specification index j denotes firms and t time periods Further, variable IO jt measures the initial ownership structure of each firm j in the base period following privatization that was officially concluded in February 1995.
Variable ∆TO jt measures the subsequent changes in the type of ownership structure of each firm j in period t. Following our earlier exposition we distinguish direct and integrated control of the state as well as several types of private ownership (individual, industrial, and financial firms). Variable F jt controls for changes in the capital structure of each firm j (total liabilities and bank loans scaled by total assets) that would not be eliminated by performance averages, and variable Ind controls for industrial sectors in which firm j is categorized. Finally, constant α captures the remaining dispersed or unidentified ownership and ε it is the error term. The above specification yields the marginal effects of specific types of owners and for our aim it delivers the effects of state control on corporate performance in percentages.
We present the estimates of the above specification in Tables 7-10. Tables 7 and   8 contain the results of the effects of ownership structure on performance measured by growth in operating profit scaled by total assets. In Table 7 the majority threshold of 50% voting rights is used to define the benchmark of direct control, while the 25% threshold is applied in Table 8 In Tables 9 and 10 we present the results of the effects of ownership structure on performance measured by growth in sales scaled by total assets. The structure of both tables is the same as that of the two described earlier. The evidence in the form of statistically significant coefficients is more frequent than in the case of operating profit. A striking finding is the negative effect of state control in the form of initial ownership on firms' performance, which is deepening with time. This is also evidenced by coefficients related to changes in state ownership, as the state looses its grip. A potential reason for the worsening performance may lie in the state selling the best performing firms first. An alternative explanation of these patterns comes from the early post-privatization period when firms controlled by the NPF had better access to various tenders commissioned by the state, chiefly through informal networks and unofficial preferential access to tender conditions. These practices have been described by Lízal and Kočenda (2001) and criticized by Mlčoch (1998; p.952) , who stressed that "the government should not meddle in a company's microeconomic choices". This environment enabled NPF-controlled firms to affect sales during the first period immediately following privatization, mainly through orders born from tenders. This was occurring without pressure on cost reduction, the feature that is in accord with our previous findings related to operating profit. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyze the extent of the integrated control of the state over privatized firms during the post-privatization decade (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) in the Czech Republic. During this period the integrated control potential of the state resembled a corporate pyramid, a business structure found worldwide. We find that the control potential that a corporate pyramid offers is not large when the Czech state is considered as the ultimate owner at the top of the pyramid. The state favored direct control provided by voting rights measured by a 50% threshold and such control increased when a less conservative 25%
threshold was adopted. The use of the less conservative benchmark has been fully justified since no other subject with an exceeding extent of voting rights was detected at the same time. While pyramidal control was not fully utilized, the golden share in the hands of the state substantially enhanced its ability to control firms in terms of their numbers as well as in terms of the assets or sales they represent. We also analyze the effect of direct and integrated state ownership on corporate performance. We find that state control resulted in declining and even negative corporate performance in firms where the state was engaged through various means of control.
Integrated state control was shown to be mostly inferior when compared with private types of ownership.
The numbers in our extensive data set provide hard evidence that the state indeed remained an important owner of privatized firms for a considerable period of time. Its reluctance to vacate its ownership positions is in striking contrast with the lack of capacity to push corporate performance in order to collect larger tax volumes. Lack of focus and inter-agency cooperation as well as the simple inefficiency of the state bureaucracy are the most likely reasons behind our findings. Big industrial Co.
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